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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to examine the characteristics of deci-
sion making in the entrepreneurial networking practices through differ-
ent phases of establishing a novel innovation firm characterised with high 
level of product or service innovativeness and lack of resources. The pa-
per first presents different stages of establishing a firm and its’ distinc-
tive characteristic. Then we explain the characteristics of networking in 
different stages of the establishment of the firm by the means of two 
analytical models – that of March’s “Exchange power model” and Burt’s 
“Structural holes model” in the terms we have called “soft” and “hard” 
networking. We end with the proposal of sequential use of various net-
working practices for the purpose of better resource orchestration and 
leverage of power.
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INTRODUCTION
Starting up a firm is always done by imitation to some extent. However, there is a great 
variety in the character of the innovative element of the start-up. If the innovative ele-
ment is small, we assume that the potential profits are low but so is the level of risk. An 
example of this would be starting up a barbershop, or a hamburger bar. 
If the innovative element is big, both the potential profits and risks are high. An example 
of this would be an airline company with planes based on an inexpensive anti-gravity 
generating system. In this case, the risk involved would be a complex compound of 
various elements. Consequently the risk would be less easy to communicate about. The 
emphasis here is on the innovative element. We assume that it is the company that 
gains control of the innovative element that is able to extract the profit. In this paper we 
will discuss starting a firm in this second category, where the innovative element is big. 
Seen from the innovators perspective the question is: How can I maintain control over 
my innovation but still create value?1  Teece [21] shows that maintaining control by the 
innovator cannot be taken for a granted. 
The well documented Schumpeterian notion of innovation as an element of market 
disequilibrium is also argued by Hitt et al. [cf.8] who state the following: 
Creating novel (radical) innovation often requires a significant investment of time, effort, 
and frequently financial capital as well. Because firms rarely have the resources needed 
to achieve this type of innovation internally, they frequently search external sources to 
locate them. To do so, they may need to develop networks of partners...Frequently, new 
venture firms are more creative and thus can develop more novel innovations, while 
established firms are effective in adding new features to and improving their current 
products to maintain an advantage in the market. (p.67)
In this paper, first we will explain the characteristics of networking with respect to the 
ability of the player to reap the fruit of the potential start up. In order to present that, 
we will use the Exchange Model of Power by March [17] and the Structural Holes Model 
by Burt [2]. After that we will explain different stage of starting a firm and continue by 
explaining the characteristics of networking in each of the stages. Moreover, we will 
continue with combining these two theoretical principles in order to define the char-
acteristics and concepts of what we call “soft” and “hard” networking. We will shortly 
present various networking practices and then offer our solution of the necessity of 
their sequencing, in order to better orchestrate resources [cf.8] and leverage power.   
POWER EXCHANGE AND USAGE OF STRUCTURAL HOLES IN 
NETWORK CREATION AND RESOURCE ACQUISITION 
Kumon [15] states that  network represents a set of actors coming together to share 
useful knowledge and information, by which they should achieve mutual understand-
1  For the discussion of value creation by entrepreneurs see [8]. 
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ing and a basis for further collaboration with the main ingredient that of mutual trust. 
Networks are there to provide both individual and the collective, with attainment of 
individual/mutual goals.  The crucial element for the entrepreneur to start a business 
becomes resources, [7] which they either possess on their own or use networking to get 
them ([24]; [10]; [19]; [22]). Burt [cf.2] defines resources that a player brings into arena 
as that comprised: financial capital, i.e. cash and cash equivalents, human capital, i.e. in-
dividual’s personal qualities fortified by the knowledge gain through education and ex-
perience, and social capital, i.e. various relationships with other players/stakeholders.2
He continues in arguing that, since the reality on the market is imperfect and not per-
fect competition, social capital becomes final arbiter of competitive success. Even if an 
entrepreneur possesses knowledge and financial capital, if the social capital is inade-
quate there is greater risk of failure. These go in line with Teece [cf.21] and his analysis 
of why innovators do not necessarily obtain the economic returns from their innova-
tion. He argues that in different environmental positions (dependent on the nature of 
technology, efficacy of legal mechanism and the stage in evolutionary development of 
particular industry) different channel strategies should be made with respect to acquir-
ing complementary assets. Whether an entrepreneur contracts or builds manufactur-
ing, distribution, service etc. will be highly  dependent on imitativeness of product,  the 
existence of dominant design and the generic resources that can be used. 
As Teece [cf. 21] himself argues: “…. a profit seeking innovator, confronted by weak 
intellectual property protection and the need to access specialized complementary as-
sets and/or capabilities, is forced to expand its activities through integration if it is to 
prevail over imitators.” (p. 296)
In the competitive arena each of the players has its own network of contacts.  Burt [cf.2] 
argues that, networks as a social capital, provide entrepreneurs with profit, measured 
by the rate of return on a particular investment.  The increase of the rate of return on 
particular investment will be dependent on the power and control of the entrepreneur 
in the competitive arena.  March [cf. 17] takes it a step further from increasing the 
return of the investment to saying that entrepreneur wants to fulfil his/her own prefer-
ences and identities. 
According to him, the power is the ability of the actor to get what he/she wants. The 
basis of it lies in the inconsistent preferences and identities of each of the actors in the 
process of decision-making. Since the existing environment is too narrow for every one 
of them to get what they want, the power becomes the desired capability of the actors 
to align the decision making process with his/her preferences and identities.  To exhort 
power and gain control the actor, in our case entrepreneur uses the so called structural 
holes  or non-equivalencies between the players in the arena [cf.2].  Dependent on the 
structure of player’s network and the location of the particular contacts actor can ben-
efit from the access to information which he/she could hardly obtain on his/her own. 
2  For thorough discussion on social capital see [11]. 
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In the exchange model of power, each of the participants enters into voluntary exchange 
relationship regulated by some set of rules. Those rules are created by the characteristic 
of the structural autonomy of the networks existing in the particular market. The more 
the parties are plenty and disorganized the more there is the opportunity for taking the 
advantage of the structural holes and vice versa [cf. 17].
 For example, if an entrepreneur-producer enters into a low-autonomy network of dom-
inant customers and suppliers, who amongst themselves are interconnected, which 
means that structural holes are scarce, then the rules of the game (share in profit, price 
etc.) are established by that dominant parties.  The producer here will end up with mi-
nor share in profit, regardless of how massive supply and demand is. 
The inconsistencies between the actors in the arena will be removed by the power of 
the dominant parties and can be based on:
1. aligning the incentives, by for example contracts, threats and deterrence  and 
2. aligning the identities and rules by for example, selection of partners with 
similar background, education, talents, interests into decision-making pro-
cess [cf.2].
As we stated earlier, each of the participants brings into the arena different kinds of 
resources and seeks to improve his/her position by trading with other participants. Lack 
or abundance of structural holes becomes a constraint or an advantage for an entrepre-
neur eager to enter certain market. The ability of the entrepreneur to pursue his/her 
own preferences or fulfil his/her own identity in particular market depends on 3 things 
[cf.17]:
1. who has control over the rules, since he/she sets the playing field for deci-
sions and has the power to constrain them
2. who has control over resources, especially the resources desired by other 
person since the controlling party can then demand in exchange what they 
want and that does not necessarily have to be reciprocal in nature
3. who has control over preferences and identities, meaning that the true power 
lies in the capability of the actor to persuade other parties in decision-making 
process that what he/she has is exactly what the other party wants. Instead 
of seeking to provide things that other actors want, the controlling party in-
duces others to want the things he/she can provide. 
Combining this view with Burt’s thinking, the control in the arena or market is executed 
by the power of structural holes. If the entrepreneur comes to the market with his/her 
own autonomous network, his/her negotiating power increases with respect to the lack 
of organization and inter and intra connections between the other players in the mar-
ket. Thus, such social capital which entrepreneur brings makes it into a  productive asset 
[1] making possible certain decision making which would be if not impossible, than very 
difficult without it.  The more the market is unorganised and rich in players the more the 
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entrepreneur can exhort control by being sort of a broker or tertius gaudens (the third 
who benefits) between the different parties in the environment [cf.2].  
Of course, the nature of the networking varies in different phases, and power and con-
trol have another meaning at different stages of the establishment of the firm. 
Johannisson [12] states that establishment of the firm follows a spiral change model. It 
begins with the intuitive idea, a vision that will guide and govern future actions through 
development of a venture concept. Such a venture concept then becomes basis for the 
linkages with the environment.
STAGES IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FIRM
Based on the literature ([20]; [23]; [cf. 12]; [cf.7]) we have chosen to follow a three-stage 
model of establishment of the entrepreneurial firm. The following chapter represent its’ 
short presentation.
The first stage in the establishment of the firm, starts with the elaboration of this vision, 
the idea to the family and close friends, since entrepreneurs do not want to make any 
widespread commitment to any potential choice [cf.7]. This is the stage which  Wilken 
[cf.23] calls motivation stage; Stanworth and Curran [cf.20] refer to it as the artisan 
latent social identity of the entrepreneur. Following the Stanworth and Curran model, 
Johannisson [cf.12] continues that ties between the artisans or the founding managers 
and their community are based on moral commitment and trust. The function of this 
closest community is to give the artisans a mental support and a frame of reference in 
materialising entrepreneurial vision. 
In the second stage, entrepreneurs are prone to contact large set of people, since they 
do not know specifically who could be of greatest help to them [cf.7] For Wilken [cf.23] 
this stage is called planning stage. For Stanworth and Curran [cf.20] this is the stage 
where artisans break away from social norms, i.e. ingrained traditions [cf.12] and are 
adopting the identity of the entrepreneurs. Their arena becomes the market and this 
is the stage in which they spend most time maintaining and developing contacts [cf.7]. 
They also use their personal networks and mentors, i.e. persons who will incorporate 
them into possible wider structures, as a potential safety net [cf.12].  
In the third stage, the establishment stage, the business is running and entrepreneurs 
use networks more as the resource bank [cf.20] concentrating on  the key persons who 
provide them with the resources and commitment [cf.7]. Relationships are managed by 
contractual and barter relationships [cf.12]. In Stanworth and Currans’s model [cf.20] 
entrepreneurs become managers, with built social position, which is only increased and 
maintained (legitimised) by membership in social clubs, professional societies and po-
litical associations.
| 72 |
Characteristics of entrepreneurial networking practices through different phases ...
THE NATURE OF NETWORKING IN VARIOUS PHASES OF ES-
TABLISHING A FIRM – “SOFT” AND “HARD” NETWORKING
Johannisson [cf.12] argues that an entrepreneur’s personal contacts play a dual func-
tion. First they provide social support, a safety net, which allows the entrepreneur to 
break social norms in the process of risk-taking. Second, the entrepreneur’s personal 
network is an instrument by which one acquires environmental resources, and it is the 
vehicle by which the organisational mission is carried out..
As we stated earlier, the essence of the networking is coming into the possession of the 
resources, which entrepreneurs do not posses themselves. As the establishment of the 
firm proceeds, the nature and characteristic of the networking changes, with respect 
to the: 
1. consistency and alignment of the identities and preferences of the actors and
2. the terms on which the relevant resources are acquired [cf.17]
Previous research has shown that social networks will influence the outcome of en-
trepreneurial actions, dependent upon the people’s original positions and by thus will 
influence the nature of resources provided by the social networks depending on the 
strength of the ties. [16] 
In order to  depict the nature of networking in various stages of firms’ establishing, tak-
ing into consideration March’s exchange power model [cf.17] and Burt’s structural holes 
idea [cf.2], we have coined the terms “soft” and “hard” networking.  
“SOFT” NETWORKING
In the first stage of a start-up, the motivation phase, we assume that the entrepreneur 
is networking without making any formal contracts with the people in the network. 
Networking is done first within the entrepreneurs existing network, the so called high 
density network [6]. 
Gradually the network extends beyond the initial network and includes new actors. This 
is especially important if the entrepreneurs have some basic idea which can be poten-
tially copied, thus the lower density networks are needed, in order for the idea not to 
be imitated or potentially stolen [cf.6].  The networking in this phase is mapping out the 
features of the environment in which the future firm is going to be placed. The different 
features of the landscape are being analysed, that give the entrepreneur clues where to 
move next to gain more information on aspects vital to the business idea. 
The networking is characterised by certain softness, because in this phase the entre-
preneur is not offering much in return to his/her contacts other than doing the good 
deed of the day. The networking in the first phase is characterised by aligned and con-
sistent preferences, to a greater extent than in any other phase.  The entrepreneur is 
also learning about the identities and preferences of the new actors in the network. 
([cf.17], [cf.2])
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However, the soft networking leads up to a change, because underneath this soft at-
mosphere, the ambitions of the entrepreneur are lurking and in this mapping process, 
some contacts become more important for the realisation of the start-up than the oth-
ers. 
“HARD” NETWORKING
Morris [18] claims that resource acquisition and application is one of the most salient 
but under-researched issues affecting start-ups. As Klyver et el. state [14]: “Among the 
most important resources that networks can provide are:
 - Information (sensible as well as non-sensible, diverse as well as non-diverse)
 - Access to finance
 - Access to skills, knowledge and advice (all aids to competency)
 - Social legitimacy
 - Reputation and credibility” (p.332)
When you look at a budding organisation, you see that the way it is identifying, acquir-
ing and combining its resources, creates the unique identity of the firm, and that this 
also place limits on the scale and scope of the firms operations, determining the strate-
gic direction of the venture. It goes in line with the so called strategic entrepreneurial 
mindset which is not only preoccupied with sense making and questioning of predom-
inant decision-making logic in the context of changing goals and environment, but it is 
also a mindset capable of revisiting truths one has about the existing markets in order 
to orchestrate restructuring and acquiring scarce resources ( [9], [cf.8])
Starting from planning stage particularly and on to the establishment stage,  the net-
working takes on a different character, it becomes hard. The alignment of preferences 
is to be established based on the notion of who controls the resources and thus makes 
the rules of the game. Networking becomes the arena in which both of the parties want 
to exhort as much control as possible and induce the others to want the things/he she 
can provide. ([cf.17], [cf.2])
Generally, the entrepreneur enters into planning stage with a  weak negotiating posi-
tion, because she/he has little to offer in return, other than the option of a relatively 
high yield for the resource owner if they can reach an agreement of an “if ..- then ..” 
nature. The entrepreneur cannot offer concrete and binding orders, because the deci-
sion to enter the establishment phase is to be made. As we pointed out earlier, keeping 
the essence of the business idea relatively diffuse for the resource owner, in this type 
of negotiation, is important, but it further weakens the position of the entrepreneur, 
because the resource provider will perceive the diffuseness as an increased risk. The 
resource provider is also, in most cases, someone who is able to determine the rules 
of the exchange because of the special knowledge of the resource the provider is con-
trolling. Thus, as Teece [cf.21] argues, unless the business idea is innovative enough to 
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enable one to gain control over the complementary assets needed to make and sell the 
product, weak negotiating terms will do little to start a new entrepreneurial venture.3 
When the entrepreneur starts to plan, he/she does that with an essential task of iden-
tifying the cost of the resources that goes into the product or  service, or the cost of 
gaining access to places or streams of information that are a necessary input to the firm. 
To be able to produce a trustworthy start-up plan, it must be based on known numbers, 
or numbers that can be documented. For resources that are readily available in the mar-
ket, there is no need for vast documentation, but for resources that are scarce or not 
readily available in the market, one has to document some kind of agreement with the 
provider of such a resource. It is these agreements, which have to be negotiated. (for 
discussion on the challenges of constructing a resource base see [3]).
SEQUENTIAL USE OF NETWORKING PRACTICES FOR RE-
SOURCE ORCHESTRATION
Taking into consideration the changing nature of networking practices with respect to 
different phases in establishing a firm, the question arises of what kind of networking 
practices should a prospective entrepreneur use in order to leverage his/her weak ne-
gotiating position and acquire necessary resources. The solution we propose is the one 
of sequencing between various networking practices which will be presented below. 
First we will shortly present various networking practices possible and then present our 
solution. 
SHORT OVERVIEW OF NETWORKING PRACTICES
Influence of different cultures on networking  practices, with respect to its’ universality 
or context determination has been a researcher’s interest for decades (for thorough 
discussion see [cf.14]). For the purpose of presenting our arguments, we will use the 
classification proposed by  Zhao and Aram [cf. 24].4 In their article on networking and 
3 Competitive advantage often results from the control of valuable and rare 
resources. For review and discussion see [cf.8]
4 We are aware of the cultural determination of certain networking practices, but for 
the purpose of elucidating ideas in our paper we are following the line of thought 
presented by Kylver et al. [cf.14] which in arguing for universiality or cultural 
determination of networking practices, proposes the following classification 
based on Lonner’s writings: „The term ‘simple universal’ means a phenomenon is 
constant worldwide. ‘Variform universal’ refers to a general relationship that holds 
across countries, but which is moderated by culture. ‘Functional universal’ refers 
to situations where relationships are the same within groups.... It is not longer a 
matter of either being totally universal or totally cultural determined.“ (p.344). 
Their study of networking practices suggested in 20 countries suggests its’ „variform 
universal“ nature.  
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growth of young ventures in China they give overview of various mechanisms that are 
applied to balance out the power between the entrepreneur and her/his environment 
– starting from long term mechanisms of cooperation (e.g. licensing agreements, joint 
production development, long-term subcontracting), mutual mechanism (e.g. offering 
free trials, providing market and technical information of products) to informal mech-
anism (e.g. business lunches, gift giving) and arm’s length contacts (e.g. business calls 
and meetings). 
SEQUENCING OF NETWORKING ACTIVITIES AND ORCHESTRATION OF 
RESOURCES
All of these mechanisms are, we imagine, used in establishment stage of the start-up, 
but in order to get to the third stage we believe that first two stages require sequencing, 
i.e. using each of the mechanisms at the appropriate time, starting with informal mech-
anisms, and ending with mechanisms for long term cooperation. 
But why not go directly to the negotiation of mutual mechanisms and the long-term 
contracts? Why is this sequencing so important? According to March [cf. 17] in the ne-
gotiation process one exchanges power. We have already seen that the entrepreneur is 
in a weak negotiating position. 
However, we claim that by sequencing the negotiations between the different resource 
providers, the entrepreneur can gradually develop the resource base and gain more 
negotiating power. The negotiating power is gained by acting as an alternating agent 
for different resource providers in the new firm. It is by acting as an agent for different 
actors that would not otherwise meet to discuss and investment in the new entrepre-
neurial endeavour, that the entrepreneur is able to create a position in the marketplace. 
One important issue especially for entrepreneurial ideas with high innovativeness and 
lack of resources needed for its’ realization, is the potentiality of imitation and theft. 
Hitt et al. [cf. 8] argue that in order to successfully orchestrate resources, some level of 
protection of both intellectual property and complementary resources is needed. This 
provides negotiating power to the entrepreneur, much needed especially with scarce or 
no resources to execute his/her idea successfully in the market.
How then is the negotiating power used? It helps if a start-up has patents or “preemp-
tive patents” ([25]; [cf. 8]) however it need not be the only course of venue, especially 
with start-ups who lack  resources (especially finances). Negotiated contracts [5] might 
also be the way to leverage on power.  If the entrepreneur is willing to offer the resource 
provider high yields for the resource, but in return for that, the resource provider must 
give the promise not to infringe further into the room that the innovative element cre-
ates. This is especially true for innovative, hi-tech industries, where experimentation 
is required from both the entrepreneur and the resource provider (for discussion and 
examples see [13]).  
At the start of this process, the resource provider is willing to accept this, since the per-
ceived risk is so high. Later in the process the perceived risk might have decreased, but 
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then the entrepreneur has gained a position based on the initial contracts made by the 
parties, and the risk of losing a good contract becomes the risk the resource provider 
has to face, even if infringement would be more profitable.
If done successfully, the entrepreneur should be left with a certain room of profitability 
created by the innovative element, and the resource providers partly dependent on the 
firm, as a “customer” for their resources.5
There are many ways to start negotiating with the different actors, but keeping March’s 
power exchange model [cf. 17]  in mind, one can assume that the most successful se-
quence would be starting the negotiations with the resource providers that are in the 
weakest negotiating position and that are the less likely to infringe on the room created 
by the innovative element.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have looked at the entrepreneurial activity and the different phases of 
starting up a firm and put it into relation with March’s [cf. 17] theory of decision making 
and Burt’s [cf. 2] structural holes theory. We then defined the entrepreneurial endeav-
our, as acquiring resources from other actors, without having proprietary resources in 
the initial phase. We also stated that there was a difference between start-ups with a 
small innovative element and those with a large innovative element and that we would 
discuss the latter category. 
In some sense there is an ambiguity in the entrepreneur’s relation to the networking 
environment. This paper discussed one possible explanation for this ambiguity. The net-
working activity went from soft in the motivation stage, to hard in the planning and 
establishment stage. The shift is caused by the need of the entrepreneur to gain control 
over resources that are necessary for the new firm, and must engage in negotiations 
with actors in the network. We also concluded that, initially the entrepreneur is in a 
weak negotiating position.
The second hypothesis we suggest one can draw by using March’s model, is that entre-
preneurs must develop their network assets in sequences. By sequencing, the entre-
5 Coff [cf. 5] described the story of Tony Faddel who „had the  original idea for a 
hard disk based music player coupled with an online music store. This required 
multiple resources and capabilities that he lacked. Over time he partnered with 
Apple, PortalPlayer  (designer of the chipset and firmware), and an  array of 
other suppliers.“ (p. 712). He offered first his idea to his former employer, Philips 
Electronics, then tried his own failed venture, before turning to Apple. In order to 
protect his asset, he first started as the contractor with Apple, then based on his 
critical personal complementary assets, which were comprised of him being and 
innovator and knowledge of innovation, he became senior executive with large 
equity, gaining almost 38 million dollars for the creation of new value ([cf.5]; [cf 8, 
p. 66]). 
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preneurs are able to gain leverage in their position relative to the other actors, and in 
that way create their own resource and power base. If sequencing is not used there is 
the possibility that resource providers in the network, will take over the room that the 
innovative element has created. 
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